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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper was to re-examine the relationship between the quality of public 
institutions and corruption. Estimations from generalized method of moments show that better 
public institutions (regulation, bureaucracy, political structures) are associated with lower 
levels of corruption.  
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 1- Introduction 
Many empirical studies examine the impact of a specific public institution 
(bureaucratic, judicial or political) on corruption. Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) found that the 
relationship between economic freedom and corruption depends on a country's level of 
development. Ledermann et al (2005) confirmed the importance of political institutions in 
curbing corruption. Seldadyo and de Haan (2005) using Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) 
concluded that institutional variable like political freedom and judicial system affect 
corruption. Using the EBA, Serra (2006) showed that corruption is lower where democratic 
institutions have been preserved for a long continuous period but higher when political 
instability is important. 
 
The present paper departs from many existing empirical studies of determinants of 
corruption on three main fronts. Firstly, it considers public institutions in a wide sense to 
include bureaucratic administrations and political structures as well as policies undertaken by 
public authorities. Estimates based on the same sample make it possible to compare the 
impact of various aspects of public institutions.  
 
Secondly, we address the problem of endogeneity of the variables of public 
institutions. Previous studies did not adequately account for the problem of simultaneity bias 
and endogeneity and hence the coefficients estimated were biased. Public institutions affect 
the level of corruption but conversely corruption shapes the quality of these institutions. In 
addition, the problem of endogeneity may result from errors of measurement of corruption 
and indicators of the quality of public institutions, which are subjective evaluations.  
 
 Thirdly, this paper addresses the issue of omitted variables by controlling for many 
other determinants of corruption. Lambsdorff and Cornelius (2000), using simple correlation 
coefficients, showed a positive relation between corruption and the uncertainty of regulation. 
Chowdhury (2004) used instrumental analysis when analyzing the impact of democracy and 
press freedom on corruption but did not completely control for other determinants of 
corruption (their table 2). The omission of variables such as social structures or economic 
factors may lead to inconsistent estimates.  
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 In section 2, we outline the empirical approach and selected variables and in section 3 
present the main results. 
 
 2- The empirical approach and data 
 Estimations cover five periods (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004) and a sample of 73 
countries. Several corruption equations are estimated with right-side variables capturing 
public institutions and a set of control variables (economic development, social and historical 
variables).  
 
 2.1- The econometric method 
 To deal with the problem of endogeneity, we used the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM), which is more efficient than the standard instrumental variables in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity (Baum et al, 2003).  
 We parsimoniously chose as instruments the political rights index of “Freedom 
House” and the democracy index of “Polity IV”. The political right variable ranks countries 
on a scale of 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). The democracy index describes the general 
openness of public institutions to political parties and ranges from 0 (low) to 10 (high).  
 While these variables may characterize democratic systems in general, we argue that 
they are exogenous. First, several studies found no significant effect of democracy on 
corruption (Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2000; Rose-Akerman, 1999; Serra, 2006; Brunetti and 
Weder, 2003). Secondly, in order to validate these instruments, we performed the test of weak 
instruments based on the statistics of Cragg-Donald (1993) (see Stock and Yogo, 2005; 
Staiger and Stock, 1997) and the over-identification test based on the J statistic of Hansen 
(1982).  
 Since time-varying variables of control may be potentially endogenous, we use their 
lagged values.  
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 2.2- Measurement of corruption 
 Data on corruption come from the database of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(KKM) (2005). We rescaled this variable from 0 (lowest corruption) to 10 (highest 
corruption). This index is a composite one and is therefore more reliable than any individual 
indicator. The KKM data include continuous variables, and so allow us to dispense with 
multinomial model regressions.  
 2.3- Measuring the quality of public institutions 
We used six different indicators: 
1- Quality of bureaucracy: measures the important changes in public policies or the 
frequency of interruption in delivery of public services. 
2- Effectiveness of government: includes the stability, predictability and effectiveness of 
governments’ actions.  
3- Public regulation: measures quantitative regulations, price controls and other 
unjustified interventions in economic activities. 
4- Influence and political responsibilities: includes political rights and civil liberties, 
participation in electoral process, independence of medias, accountability and 
openness in public decisions. 
5- Civil liberties: describes the general state of liberty in a country.  
6- Efficiency of judicial system: includes the respect of law and order, the predictability 
and efficiency of the judicial system and enforcement of contracts. 
 
Each variable was rescaled so that lower values represent bad performance and higher 
values good performance.  
A main characteristic of the indicators of public institutions is the high correlation 
between them (simple correlation coefficient between 0.52 and 0.93) (table 1). 
Table 1: Correlations coefficients  
 REGUL BUREAU GOVEFF VOICE LAW CIVIL 
       
REGUL       
BUREAU 0.6600**      
GOVEFF 0.8445** 0.7931**     
VOICE 0.5389** 0.5109** 0.4983**    
LAW 0.8314** 0.7907** 0.9352** 0.5225 **   
CIVIL 0.7130** 0.5039** 0.5843** 0.5283** 0.5891**  
OVERALL 0.9320** 0.7975** 0.9272** 0.7032** 0.9259** 0.7660** 
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3- Empirical estimates 
 3.1- Main results 
The results from the GMM are given in table 3. We controlled for many other 
determinants of corruption as already identified in the literature. The statistics of Hansen and 
Cragg-Donald (table 2) show the relevance and weak exogeneity of instrumental variables.  
Tableau 2: Corruption and quality of public institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Quality of bureaucracy -1.681***       
 (-7.16)       
Effectiveness of government  -2.069***      
  (-12.1)      
Quality of public regulation   -1.717***     
   (-8.30)     
Political responsibilities    -1.388***    
    (-6.72)    
Civil liberties     -0.987***   
     (-7.14)   
Efficiency of judicial system      -1.782***  
      (-13.6)  
Overall public performance       -1.309*** 
       (-11.6) 
Log of real GDP per capita 0.000172 -0.0120 0.0333 0.0175 -0.00115 -0.00582 -0.00191 
 (0.0057) (-0.62) (1.12) (0.51) (-0.041) (-0.38) (-0.096) 
Public expenditure/GDP -0.0485** -0.0118 -0.0391*** -0.0576** -0.0611*** -0.0174* -0.0461*** 
 (-2.58) (-1.15) (-2.65) (-2.32) (-3.06) (-1.82) (-3.77) 
Trade openness 0.000526 -0.000864 0.00210 0.00499** 0.00368** 0.00160* 0.00294*** 
 (0.27) (-0.97) (1.32) (2.06) (2.14) (1.66) (2.78) 
Fuel exports  -0.00306 -0.00342 -0.00856* 0.00814* 0.00510 0.00427** 0.000837 
 (-0.75) (-1.38) (-1.96) (1.95) (1.32) (2.38) (0.32) 
Mineral exports  -0.0307*** -0.000275 0.00377 0.0109 -0.00369 -0.00243 -0.000790 
 (-3.99) (-0.067) (0.65) (1.11) (-0.53) (-0.67) (-0.15) 
Latitude from equator  -0.388*** -0.0242 -0.394*** -0.383*** -0.425*** -0.0318 -0.303*** 
 (-3.84) (-0.46) (-5.01) (-3.00) (-4.19) (-0.61) (-4.73) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.906 0.283 1.613*** 1.747** 2.367*** 0.181 1.167*** 
 (1.51) (0.85) (3.58) (2.41) (4.20) (0.55) (2.97) 
Religious fractionalization -1.156** 0.0292 -1.327*** -1.182** -1.115*** -0.253 -0.672*** 
 (-2.44) (0.13) (-4.19) (-2.30) (-3.18) (-1.33) (-2.77) 
Urbanization 0.00561 -0.000920 -0.00925* -0.0179** -0.0244*** -0.00945*** -0.0106** 
 (0.63) (-0.21) (-1.68) (-2.40) (-4.03) (-3.05) (-2.48) 
British legal origin 0.386 -0.131 -0.373 -0.633 8.247*** 0.00752 -0.457** 
 (1.21) (-0.88) (-1.45) (-1.64) (16.8) (0.041) (-2.15) 
French legal origin -0.435* -0.0642 0.0422 -0.247 -0.888*** 0.115 -0.138 
 (-1.96) (-0.49) (0.23) (-0.84) (-2.79) (1.05) (-0.89) 
Constant 8.947*** 5.561*** 5.277*** 5.523*** -0.131 5.669*** 5.883*** 
 (19.5) (17.1) (11.0) (8.61) (-0.54) (19.6) (18.0) 
Observations 223 235 235 225 235 235 225 
R-squared 0.71 0.91 0.79 0.50 0.63 0.92 0.86 
J statistics of Hansen 2.311 7.923 0.386 0.0741 2.141 3.056 0.00742 
(P-Value) 0.128 0.00488 0.535 0.785 0.143 0.0804 0.931 
F statistics of Cragg-Donald 21.09 23.10 40.24 32.40 529.3 34.13 94.06 
Robust t statistics in parentheses *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
Estimations show that all the variables of public performance are significantly 
inversely related to corruption. Better public regulation of economic activity helps to reduce 
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corruption. Likewise, the better the quality of bureaucracy the lower the level of corruption. 
The effectiveness of public policies has an adverse and significant effect on corruption.  
 
With respect to political institution variables, estimations evidenced a negative and 
significant causal relationship between political responsibilities, civil liberties and efficiency 
of the judicial system.  
Another important result is that each public institutions variable had a different 
reducing-impact on corruption. The variables describing the quality of government 
bureaucracy seems to have a greater impact than that of political structures. A one standard-
deviation of government effectiveness (0.94) contributes toward reducing corruption by 2 
points (=0.94*2.069) (on a scale ranging from 0 to 10). Increasing civil liberty to a level equal 
to a one standard-deviation only reduces corruption by less than 1 point: 0.81 points.  
 
 3.2- Robustness analysis 
 In addition to the six indicators, we calculated a composite index of overall public 
institution performance using the method of principal components. The rationale for 
aggregating is to obtain a better estimate of the impact of public institutions on corruption 
once the measurement errors in individual indexes are accounted for.  
 High correlations appear between this variable and the individual institutional 
variables (see table 1). 
 The last column of table 2 (7) shows a significant impact of this variable. A one 
standard-deviation change in overall public performance decreases corruption by 1.31 points, 
a decrease lower than the average impact of the quality of public administration (1.88) but 
roughly equal to the average impact of political characteristics (1.31).  
 
4- Conclusion 
 This study departs from previous empirical research and rigorously tests the causal 
relationship between the quality of public institutions and corruption by correcting for 
endogeneity. Estimations show that that better public institutions (in the form of better 
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regulation, better bureaucracy, political responsibility, a greater degree of civil liberty and a 
more effective judicial system) are associated with lower levels of corruption.  
The results of this paper therefore support institutional reforms in developing countries 
that aim at improving the quality of public institutions.  
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